Action and fight against the climate crisis in the midst of the Colombian conflict and post-conflict: efforts from the public and private sectors

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Executive summary

In 2015, under the leadership of Colombia, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and established 17 goals. Its goal number 13 is 'Action for Climate' while number 16 is 'Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions'. A year later, Colombia is reportedly signing the Final Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace (Final Agreement) with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People's Army (FARC-EP). Both years were significant for the country's political history and marked a milestone in the degradation of the nation's strategic ecosystems.

At this time, eight years from fulfilling the time imposed by the 2030 Agenda and the implementation phase of the Final Agreement, in the midst of a violent post-conflict and a selective degradation of the tropical forest, Gustavo Petro came to the presidency with his promises of total peace and the fight against climate change.

The self-proclaimed 'Government of Change' took office amid the proliferation of resilient armed oligopolies throughout the territory and the massive destruction of natural capital. Conflict, violence, and the environmental crisis continue to reveal that every territory in Colombia is an expression of the illegal economy — or war — and the legal one, where the juxtaposition of the former on the latter has prevented sustainable development and puts at risk the carrying capacity and resilience of strategic ecosystems to fight against climate change.

Under the aforementioned scenario, this policy paper is organized into five parts. The first and second parts explain how nature was instrumentalized during the armed conflict, and how it was later recognized as a victim of the conflict. The third part presents the challenges of adaptation to climate change within the framework of a violent post-conflict. The fourth part presents initiatives developed by the Colombian Military Forces, the National Army and the private sector that help offset the environmental liabilities of the armed conflict and post-conflict. Finally, the conclusions highlight the most relevant aspects of this analysis and present a series of public policy recommendations.

This policy paper has three objectives. The first one is to explain the role of nature during armed conflict and its subsequent recognition as a subject of rights and victim, and the impact this has on climate action. The second one is to highlight the nexus between climate adaptation and territorial peacebuilding, in the midst of a violent post-conflict. The third one is to present initiatives from the public and private sectors that have a two-way impact in the fight against climate change and the construction of territorial peace.

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Now, after analyzing the three objectives, the following far-reaching recommendations can be proposed:

For the executive sector:

- Priority implementation of the environmental provisions of the Final Agreement and the Environmental Zoning Plan (PZA, for its acronym in Spanish).
- Address the final initiatives of the Regional Transformation Action Plans (PATR, for its acronym in Spanish) as adaptation and risk strategies based on Ecosystems (EbA, ecosystems-based adaptation) and Communities (CbA, community-based adaptation).
- Comply with Judgment STC-4360 of 2018.
- Adopt a state Defense and Security Policy (PDS, for its acronym in Spanish) that gives continuity over time to the actions implemented by the Army and Military Forces.

For the legislative sector:

- Support the creation of the National Forest Extension and Bioeconomy Service presented by the National Government. This service should promote a change in the regional model in terms of policy and productive chains and create a forest inventory. From this, strengthen the forest economy nuclei.

For the executive and judicial sector:

- It is taken for granted that every action of reparation on nature is aimed at recovering its initial state. However, this action must also implicitly have a component that prevents the deepening of socio-environmental conflicts associated with the use of territory and the quality of natural resources.

KEYWORDS
Crimes Against Nature; Deforestation; Natural Security; Colombia.

1. Instrumentalization of nature during armed conflict and environmental liabilities

Throughout the expansion and consolidation of the armed conflict in Colombia, the FARC-EP were characterized as the strongest illegal armed actor and the one that had the greatest presence in the country's municipalities. Its strategy was to create 'para-states' based on the establishment of 'liberated zones' and the generation of safe mobility spaces (Ávila, 2019). They did this by taking out the institutions and isolating society. As a result, in different areas of the country — especially in the southeast — and as a military strategy, they managed to build very strong social relationships with the communities. In environmentally strategic areas, such as the Amazon region, they acted as an 'environmental authority' and created coexistence manuals where, among other things, they regulated forest clearing and prohibited hunting (Franco, 2021).

"This way of militarily instrumentalizing nature responded to an umbrella strategy under which the standing forest as an enclave helped the guerrillas hide kidnapped people, trafficking routes for arms, fauna and flora, and drug trafficking."

This way of militarily instrumentalizing nature responded to an umbrella strategy under which the standing forest as an enclave helped the guerrillas hide kidnapped people, trafficking routes for arms, fauna and flora, and drug trafficking. In addition to launching attacks and hiding from government forces. However, while in the Amazon region biota was used as a shield, and indirectly protected by a purely military interest, in other areas of the country it was becoming a passive victim of the armed conflict.

One of the triggers that contributed considerably to the environmental deterioration was the uncontrolled oil spill, following the attack on oil infrastructures. For example, over a thousand pipeline blasts were recorded during 1986 and 1991 (MinAmbiente, 2012). This practice, which was part of the *modus operandi* of the FARC-EP and the National Liberation Army (ELN, for its acronym in Spanish), generated immeasurable environmental liabilities.

In fact, between 1976 and 2015, there were eight major oil spills; however, the one that left the greatest socio-environmental liabilities was the blasting of the Trans-Andean pipeline in June 2015. On June 21, the FARC-EP spilled more than 410,000 gallons of crude into the Pinauló and Guisa streams, which reached the Mira River and then the sea. These water sources that supply the main agreement of the municipality of Tumaco left 160 thousand people without water (Calle, 2020; Franco, 2021). The impact was of such magnitude that the Special Justice for Peace (JEP, for its acronym in Spanish) took it into consideration in macro case 002[2].

Another emblematic event occurred in 2015 in the department of Putumayo, which is part of the Amazon region. On that occasion, 19 drivers were forced by the Front 49 of the FARC-EP to open the tanks' valves that contained five thousand barrels of crude oil (FIP, 2015; Semana, 2015). More than 450 families were affected by the contamination of water sources.

Two more triggers that contributed to and continue to accelerate the deterioration of the environment, through deforestation and pollution, are criminal gold mining and the planting of illicit crops. All illegal armed actors (FARC-EP, ELN, paramilitaries, dissidents, and other Organized Armed Groups - GAO, for its acronym in Spanish) have benefited from these illegal economies. Regarding the first illegal economy, the environmental liabilities it has left - the soil, subsoil, and water contamination by mercury and cyanide — have not been quantified.

2. The macro cases are the large legal investigations carried out by the JEP in order to clarify the most serious events that took place during the armed conflict and punish those most responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Those appearing are members of the extinct FARC-EP, paramilitaries, members of the public force, civilians and officials or public servants who voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction.

However, in 2016, as a result of criminal mining, the Sambingo River disappeared, which was located in the department of Cauca. However, with regard to the planting of illicit crops, their illegal status usually means that they are located in geographical areas that are difficult to access, thus affecting primary or virgin forest regions.

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Since the signing of the Final Agreement for the termination of the armed conflict between the Colombian state and the FARC-EP in November 2016, 170 municipalities have been prioritized for immediate state intervention. These territories, also called 'PDET municipalities' (Development Plans with a Territorial Approach - PDET, for its acronym in Spanish), concentrated 94.2% of coca crops for that year (Decreto 893, 2017). At the level of environmental land use planning, 23% of protected environmental areas are located there. By 2017, the 170 PDET municipalities accounted for 84% of the total national deforestation rate and 25.6% of land use conflicts (Franco, 2021).

In this order of ideas, it is valid to affirm that the expectation of territorial peace and the signing of the Final Agreement marked a historical point to understand the complex paradox between the conservation and destruction of natural capital, depending on the illegal actor and the type of war economy that developed in that territory. Therefore, and considering the heterogeneity of the armed conflict in the regions and its consequences, the degradation of ecosystems is more visible in some territories than in others. That is why it is essential to bring up the recognition of nature as a victim of armed conflict, and more so in a context of climate change where the context and availability of natural resources can deepen or generate new spirals of violence.

2. Nature as a victim of armed conflict and as a restorative subject of law

Three facts are relevant to understand the legal importance of recognizing nature as a victim of the armed conflict and some natural ecosystems as subjects of rights in the midst of the climate crisis.

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The second fact is related to the recognition of some ecosystems as subjects of rights from ordinary justice."

The first is the issuance of Decree[3] Law 4633 of 2011, "Through which measures of assistance, attention, integral reparation and restitution of territorial rights are issued to victims belonging to indigenous peoples and communities." Its articles 3 'Victims' and 45 'Damage to the territory' stipulate the recognition of the territory as a victim and the attention, integral reparation, and restitution of territorial rights of the victims who belong to indigenous peoples. In this sense, there is a recognition of the territories and nature as subjects and victims of the armed conflict, which served as a prelude to the JEP so that it recognized them, legally, in the investigations it carries out.

The second fact is related to the recognition of some ecosystems as subjects of rights from ordinary justice. The Atrato River, located in the department of Chocó and the Urabá Antioqueño, was the first to be recognized through judgment T-622 of 2016 by the Constitutional Court. The second was the Amazon, by the Supreme Court of Justice in its Judgment STC-4360 of 2018.

In particular, Judgment STC-4360 (Map 1) has been historic and pioneering once it is framed in the territorial consequences of climate change. The guardianship, which was filed by 25 Colombians who were between 7 and 25 years old, demanded the legal protection of their rights based on the protection of the Amazon. They argued that their rights were threatened by the

3. This extraordinary Decree was issued by the National Government in exercise of the extraordinary powers conferred by article 205 of Law 1448 of 2011 "By which measures are issued for the attention, assistance and integral reparation to the victims of the internal armed conflict and other provisions are issued." This article recognizes that victims belonging to indigenous, Romani and black, Afro-Colombian, Raizal and Palenquera peoples and communities must have comprehensive reparation and their lands must be restored. Now, this law and Decree Law 4633 were in force until 2021. However, both regulations were extended for 10 years with Law 2078 of 2021.

impacts of climate change, which accelerated and deepened with deforestation. They also pointed out that this activity could cause a temperature increase between 1.6ºC and 2.14ºC between 2041 and 2071, precisely when they would become adults and older adults.

"In 2023, Colombia had 28 judgments where nature or a particular natural ecosystem was recognized as a subject of law."

Given this, the High Court argued that the legal protection they demanded was under the environmental principles of precaution, solidarity, and intergenerational equity. In addition, it recognized future generations and the Amazon as subjects of rights. Therefore, the municipalities that are part of their jurisdiction should update their land use plans and direct them towards adaptation to climate change. In 2023, Colombia had 28 judgments where nature or a particular natural ecosystem was recognized as a subject of law (JEP, 2023).

The third fact is the investigation of environmental crimes that the JEP has developed from positive law and common law; and the dialogical process that has taken place within it. These investigations are followed by the international community and the International Criminal Court, in particular.

In this order of ideas, the JEP advances the investigation of three macro cases (002[4], 004[5] and 005[6]) (Map 1) that focus on recognizing the violence that occurred in the framework of the armed conflict against living beings: human and non-human, where the latter involves territory and nature. In this sense, there are three macro cases in which socio-environmental and territorial damages in the prioritized municipalities are considered. "This fact recognizes the vulnerability of human-nature relationships that were systematically destroyed" (JEP, n.d. [a]). From this, the JEP determined two macrocriminal patterns in the three cases: (i) destruction of the Territory and Nature from hydrocarbon pollution and criminal gold mining; and (ii) illicit use and affectation by anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war.

Map 1. Areas of study and jurisprudential decision



Source: Prepared by the author.

However, case 002 was a pioneer in recognizing nature and territory as victims from the perspective of ethnic peoples. And cases 004 and 005 follow the same direction. In this regard, the JEP determined that the FARC-EP affected the environment in a widespread and lasting manner through: (i) installation of mines, attacks with explosives and unconventional weap-

4. Investigate the events that occurred in the ethnic territories of Tumaco, Barbacoas and Ricaurte in Nariño.

5. Urabá region (Turbo, Apartado, Carepa, Chigorodo, Mutata and Dabeida in Antioquia and Carmen del Darien, Riosucio, Unguia and Acandi in Chocó. This region is one of the areas with the greatest loss of biodiversity in the country.

6. Nasa Territory of the Cxhab Wala Kiwe and the municipalities of Caldono and Morales in Northern Cauca and Southern Valle del Cauca.

ons; (ii) invasion of ancestral ethnic territories (particularly cases 002 and 005); (iii) impact on moorlands (especially case 005); (iv) drug trafficking and criminal gold mining (JEP, n.d. [b]).

The impact on the environment results in the degradation of the quality of natural resources and the fulfillment of their ecosystem functions. This in turn has an impact on the levels of risk, consequences, and adaptation to climate change that territories and their communities have. Therefore, within the domain of public power, these three facts can be considered as a way for the state to take action in two completely interconnected directions from the principle of progressivity of rights. Basically because, when nature and territory are recognized as subjects of rights, they are implicitly considered and treated as victims with the effects and scope inherent to this condition.

Therefore, this leads to a repair and restoration process, which goes through the recognition of a climate crisis and the compensation of environmental liabilities. An example of this is the reforestation in places near the sacred sites of indigenous peoples, which coincide with points of hot biodiversity, and the recovery of rivers that became cemeteries in the worst years of the conflict.

In this order of ideas, it is possible to conclude at this point that the recognition of nature as a subject of rights, victim, and restorative subject of rights is a significant advance in the conception of how that ecosystem is seen and how it is treated. That is, it leaves aside the anthropocentric view that nature is merely an object and moves towards a national view and a long-term view of how we have to relate to that ecosystem. This means that a new pact or code of relationships is established where the interdependence between human beings and nature to survive is recognized. And this is essential to establish territorial climate mitigation and adaptation responses.

3. Adapting to climate change in the midst of a violent post-conflict

"...the link between climate change and peacebuilding during the post-conflict lies in the identification of risks and their management."

Dan Smith and Janani Vivekananda (2007) assert that the link between climate change and peacebuilding during the post-conflict lies in the identification of risks and their management. Such identification allows strengthening the adaptive capacity to reduce climate risk and the risk of a new violent conflict emerging over access to finite natural resources, such as water and land. As the authors say, the consequences of climate change will combine with other factors, putting additional pressure on post-conflict societies that tend to have a fragile system.

In a special way, and without being the objective of the Final Agreement, it is possible to direct, on the one hand, the construction of territorial peace (SDG 16) and environmental peace; and, on the other, climate action and fight (SDG 13), as part of the same sustainable strategy over time. Of the 578 total provisions of the Final Agreement, 84 can be considered environmental commitments (Sáez *et al*., 2023). In fact, Point 1 of the Agreement, which deals with Comprehensive Rural Reform and has 104 provisions, could be considered an instrument for resolving socio-environmental conflicts associated with land use.

However, within the framework of the Final Agreement, there are three management and planning instruments that have a significant scope in territorial climate action: (i) the Participatory Environmental Zoning Plan (PZA); (ii) the Development Plans with a Territorial Approach (PDET); and, (iii) the Regional Transformation Action Plans (PATR) that enshrine the final initiatives proposed in the PDET. The PZA contains the expansion of the agricultural frontier and indicates that everything that has been deforested after 2010 is considered as forest land and, therefore, must have a restoration and reforestation process. Therefore, it can be considered as an instrument to mitigate the territorial consequences of climate change (Franco, 2021). In January 2023, it was in the subregional implementation phase (Sáez *et al.*, 2023).

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For its part, it is imperative to address the initiatives that enshrine the PATR as Adaptation Strategies and risk management based on Ecosystems (EbA) and Communities (CbA). Its implementation would facilitate adapting territories to the effects of climate change through on-site prevention while improving the level of climate resilience of the population through equitable access to goods and services. For example, of the 142 initiatives from the PATR sub-regions[7] of Antioquia, 29 of them are considered EbA and CbA strategies. For its part, of the 84 initiatives in the Macarena-Guaviare PATR subregion[8], 40 are EbA and CbA strategies (Franco, 2021). Many of these strategies are aimed at reforestation, environmental land use planning, silvopastoral reconversion, and the recovery of water sources[9].

However, seven years after the signing of the Final Agreement, its implementation has been slow, with Point 1 being one of the furthest behind (Graph 1). The juxtaposition of illicit economies over licit ones in territories remains a threat to biodiversity and its ecosystem function. Deforestation continues to be the greatest manifestation of the social conflict associated with land use, the convergence of two different economies, and the lack of identity and appropriation of the territory. In other words, the expectation and delay in the construction of territorial peace became a threat to the survival of Colombia's strategic natural ecosystems. The deep-rooted fear of the FARC-EP and the structural social coercion they imposed meant that the processes of landscape transformation took place slowly. In other words, 'obedience out of fear' or 'social submission' to this organization 'favored' the conservation of certain ecosystems, including the Amazonian biota.

Graph 1. Implementation level of Point 1 of the Final Agreement



Source: Own elaboration according to Echavarría ***et al.*** (2023) and Sáez ***et al.*** (2023).

"Amid the territorial consequences of climate change, a structural solution involves the creation of a state Defense and Security Policy (PDSe, for its acronym in Spanish) based on natural security."

What the last few years have revealed is that one of the most recurrent and recycled problems in the country continues to be the uneven presence of the state in the territory and the existence of resilient illegal armed oligopolies (López, 2016). Therefore, accelerated, and full implementation of the Final Agreement is only part of the solution. Amid the territorial consequences of climate change, a structural solution involves the creation of a state Defense and Security Policy (PDSe, for its acronym in Spanish) based on natural security. Why? Because nature is the most silent victim of armed conflict and post-conflict. This encompasses not only the loss of biodiversity but also the ecosystem's resilience and the availability, in both quantity and quality, of natural resources.

So, starting from the idea that nature is the basis that sustains all life, human and non-human, the actions taken to protect and conserve it, or to end and destroy it, directly affect human well-being in the midst, for example, of projected scenarios of increased temperature[10]

7. The two subregions are Bajo Cauca and Nordeste Antioqueño, and Urabá Antioqueño. El Urabá is part of case 004.

8. This PATR subregion is part of the Amazon region.

9. 60% of water sources were potentially affected by oil spills and criminal mining.

10. Projected scenarios: 0.5°C to 1.5°C to 2040; 2.5°C to 4.5°C between 2041 and 2070; and between 3.5°C to 4.5°C in some areas

and decreased rainfall[11]. Of the 81 continental ecosystems that Colombia has, 36 are at high risk, 22 are in a critical state and 14 are in a state of danger. In addition, it is projected that by 2050 the regions with the greatest loss or degradation of ecosystems will be the Andes, the north of the Amazon and the south of the Orinoquia (Humboldt Institute, 2020). In 2018, 30% of the country's biodiversity was in great danger as a result of external tensions and threats, one of them being the presence of GAO (MinAmbiente, 2018).

"From these approaches, the bases are generated that guarantee, for example, the continuity of the sustainable actions of climate mitigation and adaptation advanced by the Army, which allow the stabilization of the territory through integral action, the preservation of the multifunctional landscape and the disruption of the conflict."

In this order of ideas, natural security is oriented towards a (i) selective approach, based on ecological task forces (ETF); and (ii) systemic, which addresses the environmental principle of interconnection (Keucheyan, 2016; Parthemore and Rogers, 2010). From these approaches, the bases are generated that guarantee, for example, the continuity of the sustainable actions of climate mitigation and adaptation advanced by the Army, which allow the stabilization of the territory through integral action, the preservation of the multifunctional landscape and the disruption of the conflict.

Landscape preservation involves the protection of tropical dry and wet forest, and water resources, two vital ecosystems for the preservation of life as we know it. Colombia has 52 million hectares of forest, and a large part of these hectares is home to the most vulnerable population. The forest is the ecosystem on which more pressure is exerted and on which the alarms are set. Therefore, a PDSe must be accompanied by a 'country bet' in which there is an incorporation of forests into the national economy, as natural capital. An example of this is Asoprocegua, in the department of Guaviare, which is located in the Colombian Amazon region (Franco, 2021).

However, by 2023 standing forest is seen as an obstacle to development by many local communities and by some departmental and local governments (Franco, 2022). This has made it easier for landowners (illegal and legal) to promote the 'investor-forester' model, causing ecosystem fragmentation in different parts of the country (Map 2). In particular, the balance and connection of ecosystems at the continental level is at risk in the Amazon. Facts that increase climate vulnerability while decreasing adaptive capacity (Franco, 2022).

Map 2. National deforestation by June 2023



Source: BISIGOI – COGFM (2023).

and between 4.5°C to 5.5°C in others, between 2070 and 2100. (BID-CEPAL-DNP, 2014)

11. It is expected that by 2040 there will be a decrease between 10% and 15%, and a decrease between 15% and 36%, over the course of the century.

The causes of deforestation remained the same as more than a decade ago. The most recurrent before November 2016 were: illicit/criminal extraction of minerals, planting of illicit crops, and illegal logging. Now, during the first quarter of March 2023, 12 active deforestation nuclei were registered (IDEAM, 2023). Those that have intensified since then include: agricultural expansion at different scales, land grabbing through prarification, unsustainable extensive livestock farming practices, and unplanned transportation infrastructure.

According to several experts (Beevers, 2012; Lujala and Rustad, 2012), post-conflict is the stage where we should most seek to invest in the reconstruction of human capital and institutions, particularly those that are in charge of the management of natural resources and their recovery, especially when the environment has been a victim of armed conflict. At the same time, this investment involves a technology and innovation component that strengthens the forest system. It is therefore necessary to know the ecosystem, understand it and protect it. This will have an impact on improving or decreasing their level of climate resilience capacity.

4. Public and private sector initiatives

As the analysis is carried out within the framework of the Colombian post-conflict, the public sector initiatives that are brought up are those carried out by the National Army (Table 1) and the Military Forces (Table 2).

Table 1. Initiatives advanced by the Army

INITIATIVES	COMMENTS	IMPACT LEVEL	
		IN THE PZA	ECHOSYSTEM RESTORATION
Environmental bubbles of the Sixth Division: early warning monitoring system that sought to prevent, control and monitor critical points of indiscriminate logging.	One of its objectives is to mitigate the effects of deforestation and illegal mining, through the involvement of civil authorities, actors and promoters of this problem, and environmentalists and protectors of water and the territory.	Medium	Low
Plano Artemis: components: i. Reforestation. ii. Prevention and state control of deforestation and trafficking of species.	Its area of operation is the country's PNN and its three objectives are: i. Stop deforestation; ii. Recover humid tropical forests; iii. Prosecute the perpetrators who are behind this ecocide.	High	Medium
Macro forest nurseries dedicated to the germination and hardening of plant material from native species of trees, "frailejones" (a native species) and wax palms. In July 2023, there were 143 forest nurseries.	Es pionero en la germinación de semillas espeletia (frailejón) para resembrar el bosque de páramo. Entre 2016 y 2022 se plantaron 20 mil especies.	High	High
Support for the "El Balso" project led by the ACSOBALSO association. The project is supported by the Artillery Battalion N. 27 in Putumayo.	This agroforestry project aims to be a legal alternative for farmers dedicated to planting illicit crops.	High	High

High
Medium
Low

Source: Own elaboration according to Franco (2021) and Gutiérrez (2019).

Table 2. Initiatives advanced by the Military Forces

	INITIATIVES	COMMENTS	IMPACT LEVEL	
			IN THE PZA	ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION
	Ayacucho Plan 2023 - 2026 brings together the objectives and actions aimed at fulfilling the constitutional mission, including facilitating national reconciliation, supporting the construction of total peace and allowing the development of a sustainable economy.	The Amazon Plan was set out in order to protect this ecosystem.	●	●
	Comprehensive Climate Change Management Plan for the Security and Defense Sector.	Objectives: i. Reduce insecurity risks and deforestation rates; ii. Support the conservation and restoration of food security; iii. Seek solutions and GHG protection, reduction and mitigation; and, iv. Promote lines of action that are aimed at adaptation and strengthening resilience in the face of changing climate conditions.	●	●

● High
● Medium
● Low

Source: Own elaboration according to the General Command of Military Forces (2023) and the Ministry of National Defense (2022).

Thus, with regard to the private sector, three national examples can be brought up that impact on the mitigation of socio-environmental conflict associated with land use, and that also go hand in hand with the containment of the agricultural frontier. Not to mention that they are projects that work with communities and seek to reduce territorial climate impacts.

Table 3. Main private sector initiatives

	INICIATIVES	COMMENTS	IMPACT LEVEL	
			IN THE PZA	ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION/ RESTORATION
Terrasos	Habitat bank models whose purpose is the conservation of biodiversity and the recovery of ecosystems. The two types of clients are the mining energy sector and infrastructure sector.	Pioneers in Colombia and Latin America. This business model allows financing conservation initiatives with private sector resources for 30 years under the principle of payment by results, so that compensation resources are not lost. Other economies are enabled from this environmental market. In 2023, eight projects covering more than three thousand hectares were underway.	●	●
ISA	The Jaguar Corridor Initiative.	In this initiative the jaguar is presented as a wide-range umbrella species. Likewise, through the conservation of this species and its habitat, other species are protected. This project does not generate environmental liabilities but welfare assistance, it is based on co-responsibility and its pillar or guiding principle is the social return on investment (SROI). In November 2023, three projects were underway.	●	●
BancO2	BancO2 Bio is a partnership between companies, governments and rural, peasant and ethnic communities around the conservation of natural ecosystems.	Economic initiative of payments for environmental services to benefit peasant families who are dedicated to the protection and conservation of forests. In November 2023, 107 companies were participating.	●	●

● High
● Medium
● Low

Source: Own elaboration according to BancO2 (2023), ISA (2023) and Terrasos (2023).

As can be seen in Tables 1, 2, and 3, the initiatives have in common the restoration, sustainable use, and conservation of the impacted ecosystem, and in this sense they are complementary. However, it is possible to affirm that those of the Army and Military Forces respond to a primary and fundamental need to stabilize the territory, while creating the necessary conditions for a transition to licit economies, such as agroforestry. On the other hand, private sector initiatives promote economic activities that align with the land's vocation and use; have the potential to promote long-term sources of employment; and can be replicated faster than those of the Military Forces in other territories.

5. Final considerations and recommendations

The recognition of nature as a victim and restorative subject of rights as a result of the environmental liabilities left by the armed conflict, and in particular the declaration of some ecosystems, such as the Colombian Amazon and the Atrato River, as subjects of rights obliges the state, at all levels, to mobilize to comply with High Courts orders. In parallel, the implementation of the Final Agreement, particularly Point 1, obliges the state to build territorial peace in the PDET municipalities. However, the great problem that the country has is the lack of state presence in the most conflictive territories and with greater natural wealth, in addition to institutional weakness and the lack of capacity and technical, administrative, and economic management to fulfill its commitments. Therefore, Colombia's historical opportunity to adapt to climate change while building territorial peace seems to be dilating.

It is then at this point that the initiatives of the Army, the Military Forces, and the private sector play a crucial role. First, because the military has the technical capacity and strength to reach anywhere in the country. Therefore, once the territory is stabilized, they can implement EbA and CbA actions and strategies through comprehensive action, which a civilian — whether an individual or a company — could not be due to the public order situation. If there were a state PDS based on natural security, these actions could be sustainable over time. Meanwhile, private sector initiatives and projects that are committed to economic reconversion and agroforestry are being consolidated in those territories that have a high ecological and ecosystem value, and low levels of violence. This duo could not only help the social, economic, and environmental reconstruction of the country.

Therefore, considering the *status quo* presented, it is valid to say that three groups of actors directly impact climate action and struggle. On the one hand, there is the public sector that shelters the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Justice, JEP, the Army, and the Military Forces. On the other hand, the private sector is promoting different initiatives, including the three that were indicated in Table 3. Finally, we have the socio-environmental actor represented by indigenous peoples and nature as a subject *per se.* The actions presented here have a legal and political nature, with socio-environmental repercussions. However, they are not enough amid a scenario as complex as the Colombian one.

Finally, the recommendations raised here are not a panacea, but specific actions that reduce the intensity of the problems that were related in this policy paper. They are:

For the executive sector:

- Priority implementation of the environmental provisions of the Final Agreement and the PZA.
- Address the final initiatives of the PATR, such as EbA and CbA strategies.
- Comply with Judgment STC-4360 of 2018.
- Adopt a state PDS that gives continuity over time to the actions implemented by the Army and the Military Forces.

For the legislative sector:

- Support the creation of the National Forest Extension and Bioeconomy Service presented by the National Government. This service should promote a change of regional model in terms of policy and productive chains and create a forest inventory. From this, strengthen the forestry economy nuclei.

For the executive and judicial sector:

- It is taken for granted that every action of reparation on nature is aimed at the recovery of its initial state. However, this action must also implicitly have a component that prevents the deepening of socio-environmental conflicts associated with the use of territory and the quality of natural resources.

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